DECENTRALIZED THREAT GOSSIP & KERNEL DROPS
Hackergate incorporates a distributed peer-to-peer threat intelligence bus. When an attacker probes an endpoint in Frankfurt, the incident is authenticated and gossiped across multi-region edge gateways in sub-50 nanoseconds, immunizing Tokyo and Virginia before the adversary rotates targets.
P2P Mesh Architecture vs Centralized SIEM
Traditional web application firewalls rely on centralized databases (Redis, Postgres, or cloud APIs) to share IP reputation. Under high volumetric attack, the database connection pool exhausts or creates regional latency penalties. Hackergate uses a pure decentralized gossip topology with zero single points of failure.
Wire Protocol v2 Specification
Nodes exchange threat intelligence over mutual TLS or HTTPS endpoints (POST /__hg/gossip). Each transmission is signed using an HMAC-SHA256 pre-shared cluster key.
| Field Name | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
event_id | UUIDv7 String | Time-ordered 128-bit unique identifier used for millisecond deduplication in bloom filter. |
origin_node | String | Canonical identifier of the edge node that first detected the attack vector. |
timestamp | Unix Timestamp | Epoch timestamp in seconds. Replayed events older than clock skew tolerance (30s) are dropped. |
action | Enum | ban_ip (single IP), ban_cidr (subnet block), pow_enforce (force browser puzzle), unban. |
target | IP / CIDR | IPv4 or IPv6 target string (e.g. 198.51.100.42 or 2001:db8::/32). |
ttl_seconds | Integer | Lifespan of the quarantine. Automatically evicted upon expiration. |
reason | String | Machine-readable threat classification (e.g. owasp_crs_sqli, bola_scanning, fake_googlebot). |
Defensive & Anti-Poisoning Guarantees
Because security events dictate firewall behavior, Hackergate incorporates rigorous cryptographic and algorithmic safeguards against cache poisoning and denial-of-service attempts.
Zero-Allocation HMAC Validation
Packets missing the X-Hackergate-Signature or providing an invalid MAC are discarded in the socket read buffer with zero memory allocations, neutralizing gossip endpoint flood attacks.
Probabilistic Bloom Filter
A 1MB in-memory counting bloom filter tracks recent event_id UUIDs. Repeated gossip loops and duplicate peer broadcasts are discarded in sub-10 nanoseconds without acquiring mutex locks.
Lock-Free Ring Buffer
Outbound gossip notifications pass through a 65,536-slot lock-free circular ring buffer. If a peer goes offline, backpressure does not slow down reverse proxy request throughput.
Configuring Mesh Gossip in hackergate.toml
Cluster mesh settings are defined in the global /etc/hackergate/hackergate.toml configuration file.
Hardware-Level Kernel Offloading via Linux nftables
Handling banned IPs inside userspace consumes CPU cycles for TCP handshakes and TLS negotiations. Hackergate integrates directly with the Linux kernel nftables subsystem via Netlink sockets.
When Hackergate bans an IP, it issues an atomic Netlink command adding the address to @hg_banned_ipv4 with the specified timeout flag. Subsequent packets from that source IP are discarded directly inside the Linux network driver before entering the TCP stack.